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ADMm.ALTY-TORTS-Recovery Permitted for Mental 
Suffering of Surviving Spouse in Death Action Under 
General Maritime Law-In re Sincere Navigation Corp.* 
A recent federal district court decision, In re Sincere Navigation 
Corp.? allowed recovery for the emotional distress of the spouse and 
the children of a seaman killed in a collision on the Mississippi 
River ·within the territorial waters of Louisiana. The action for 
·wrongful death was brought under general maritime law through a 
new federal remedy first announced in Moragne v. States Marine 
Lines, lnc.2 Moragne did not specifically enumerate the elements of 
damage for which recovery would be allowed; instead it left the 
question open for consideration in later decisions.3 Whether any 
recovery was permitted under general maritime law for mental pain 
and suffering alleged by the surviving spouse or parent of a seaman 
was the question presented in Sincere. It is submitted that the court 
acted unwisely in answering this question affirmatively; that awards 
for mental suffering were not contemplated by Moragne; and that 
such awards will frustrate the development of a uniform federal 
recovery for death on navigable waters. 
For nearly a century and a half American seamen have been en-
titled to maintenance and cure, a right which includes medical care 
and sustenance for any illness or injury occurring while in the 
service of a ship.4 The award is available without a finding of fault, 
and is made for sickness or injuries regardless of whether they arise 
out of or are causally connected with the seaman's job.5 The award, 
however, is not a completely compensatory remedy. It provides only 
for payment of the seaman's lost wages and out-of-pocket expenses 
while he recovers.6 
• 329 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1971). 
1. 329 F. Supp. 653 (E.D. La. 1971). 
2. 398 U.S. 375 (1970), overruling The Harrisburg, 119 U.S. 199 (1886) (no wrong-
ful death action in general maritime law). 
3. 398 U.S. at 4-08. 
4. H. BAER, ADMIRALTY LAW OF THE SUPREME COURT § 1-1, at 1 (2d ed. 1969); G. 
GILMORE &: c. BLACK, JR., THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY § 6-6, at 253 (1957). The first case 
to recognize this right was Harden v. Gorden, 11 F. Cas. 480 (No. 6,047) (C.C.D. Me. 
1823). See G. GILMORE &: C. BLACK, supra. 
5. Warren v. United States, 340 U.S. 523 (1951) (award to seaman injured in dance 
hall while drunk); Farrell v. United States, 336 U.S. 511 (1949)\ (award to seaman 
injured through his own negligence while overstaying his shore leave); Waterman S.S. 
Corp. v. Jones, 318 U.S. 724 (1943) (award to seaman injured on authorized shore leave 
not connected with ship's business); Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938) 
(seaman suffering from Buerger's disease entitled to award because he became in-
capacitated while a member of crew). See generally H. BAER, supra note 4, at 1-13; 
G. GIIJ\IORE &: C. BLACK, supra note 4, at 253-61. 
6. The amount paid for maintenance is based on the amount he is entitled to while 
at sea. Calmar S.S. Corp. v. Taylor, 303 U.S. 525 (1938). Cure represents payment for 
medical expenses. The award for maintenance and cure is separate from the injured 
[ 757] 
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In the Osceola,1 a 1903 case, the Supreme Court opened another 
avenue of recovery to an injured seaman by announcing the duty of 
"seaworthiness." As originally stated this doctrine permitted seamen 
to recover from the shipowner when injuries were caused by the 
"unseaworthiness of the ship or a failure to supply and keep in order 
the proper appliances appurtenant to the ship."8 It has today evolved 
into a concept of absolute liability9 both for purely structural in-
firmities10 and for shipboard operations that cause harm because of 
unsound practices11 or defective equipment.12 
The Court had held in 1886, in The Harrisburg,18 that general 
maritime law would not afford an action for ,vrongful death.14 The 
distinction between injury, for which the seaman could recover 
under unseaworthiness, and death, for which no recovery was per-
mitted, survived in general maritime law until Moragne. Chief 
Justice Waite had, however, left a small loophole in The Harris• 
burg's othenvise blanket denial of ,vrongful death recovery when he 
stated that "no action at law can be maintained for such a ,vrong in the 
absence of a statute giving the right .... "16 This language was used 
by the Court in The Hamilton16 to allow the application of the 
seaman's wages, to which he is also entitled until the end of that voyage. The Osceola, 
189 U.S. 158, 175 (1903). 
7. 189 U.S. 158 (1903). 
8. 189 U.S. at 175. 
9. See Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) (rejecting independent con• 
tractor defenseJ; Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) (rejecting fellow 
servant defense); Rich v. Ellerman &: Bucknall S.S. Co., 278 F .2d 704 (2d Cir. 1960) 
(rejecting defense of lack of notice of defect); Van Carpels v. S.S. American Harvester, 
297 F.2d 9 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 865 (1962) (rejecting defense of act 
of God); West v. United States, 256 F.2d 671 (3d Cir. 1958), affd., 361 U.S. 118 (1959) 
(rejecting defense of due diligence); Lahde v. Soc. Armodora Del Norte, 220 F.2d 357 
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 825 (1955) (rejecting defense of lack of knowledge). 
10. See, e.g., Wiel &: Amundsen A/S v. Potter, 228 F.2d 341 (9th Cir. 1955) (defec-
tive ship's railing); Gainer v. S.S. Longview Victory, 226 F. Supp. 912 (E.D. Va.), afld. 
sub nom. Thornton v. Victory Carriers, Inc., 338 F.2d 959 (4th Cir. 1964) (improper 
ventilation of hold). 
11. Waldron v. Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 386 U.S. 724 (1967) (employment 
of too few crewmen to complete task safely); Mitchell v. Trawler Racer, Inc., 362 
U.S. 539 (1959} (slime making railing temporarily slippery); Boudoin v. Lykes Bros. 
S.S. Co., 348 U.S. 336 (1955) (employment of seaman with savage and vicious nature); 
The Rolph, 299 F. 52 (9th Cir. 1924) (employment of brutal mate). See also Guiterrez 
v. Waterman S.S. Corp., 373 U.S. 206 (1963); Keen v. Overseas Tankship Corp., 194 
F.2d 515 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 343 U.S. 966 (1952). 
12. See, e.g., Seas Shipping Co. v. Sieracki, 328 U.S. 85 (1946) (broken shackle); 
Mahnich v. Southern S.S. Co., 321 U.S. 96 (1944) (parting of line). 
13. 119 U.S. 199 (1886). 
14. Prior to The Harrisburg, some lower courts had held that such a recovery did 
exist. See, e.g., The Manhasset, 18 F. 918 (E.D. Va. 1884); The Sea Gull, 21 F. Cas. 909 
(No. 12,578) (C.C.D. Md. 1865). 
15. 119 U.S. at 213. 
16. 207 U.S. 398 (1907). 
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Delaware wrongful death statute to grant recovery for a death that 
had occurred on the high seas.17 More importantly, wrongful death 
statutes were later applied to permit recovery in state territorial 
waters.18 Similarly, state statutes were applied to allow a remedy for 
the decedents' beneficiaries.19 The over-all result was patchwork 
coverage, with the harsh common-law doctrine prevailing whenever 
a state had no death statute.20 
In 1920 Congress passed two statutes of importance to injured 
seamen. The Jones Act21 provides a negligence action in favor of a 
seaman's representatives if an injury results in death.22 This wrong-
ful death action is possible only if there are in existence the benefi-
ciaries named under the Federal Employers Liability Act (FELA),23 
which is incorporated into the Jones Act. The Death on the High 
Seas Act (DOHSA)24 gives a remedy in admiralty for death by any 
wrongful act, neglect, or default that occurs beyond a marine league 
from shore.25 Protection under the Act is extended to survivors of all 
who perish at sea, not merely seamen but passengers as well.26 This 
17. 207 U.S. at 406. The Hamilton involved a state statute that apparently was 
intended to apply on the high seas. Because it was "generally understood" that state 
death statutes were not intended to apply on the high seas, the precise ruling in The 
Hamilton has had little lasting effect. See Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 
U.S. 375, 393 n.10 (1970). 
The Hamilton Court also relied on the old maxim "the law follows the flag." 207 
U.S. at 405. This doctrine is still relevant to choice of law problems in maritime cases. 
See, e.g., Richards v. United States, 369 U.S. 1, 15 (1962); Romero v. International Ter-
minal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 383 (1958); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953). 
See generally G. GILMORE & C. BLACK, supra note 4, at 386-94; Currie, The Choice 
Among State Laws in Maritime Death Cases, 21 VAND. L. REv. 297 (1968); Note, Ad-
miralty Recovery Under the Jones Act for Foreign Seamen: The Demise of the Law 
of the Flag, 49 N.C. L. R.Ev. 320 (1971). 
18. The Tungus v. Skovgaard, 358 U.S. 588 (1959); Western Fuel Co. v. Garcia, 257 
U.S. 233 (1921). 
19. United States v. The S.S. Washington, 172 F. Supp. 905 (E.D. Va.), afjd. sub 
nom. United States v. Texas Co., 272 F.2d 711 (4th Cir. 1959); Petition of Gulf Oil 
Corp., 172 F. Supp. 911 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). 
20. See generally Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 393 (1970). 
21. Act of June 5, 1920, ch. 250, 41 Stat. 988 (codified in scattered sections of 46 
U.S.C.). 
22. 46 u.s.c. § 688 (1970). 
23. 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970) [hereinafter FELA]. The Act establishes three mutually 
exclusive classes of beneficiaries: (1) the surviving spouse and children; (2) if none of 
class (1), the parents; and (3) if none of classes (1) or (2), the next of kin dependent 
upon the deceased. "And if the employee leaves no survivors in any of the classes of 
beneficiaries alternatively designated, it necessarily follows that the personal represen-
tative can not maintain any action to recover damages for the death, since there is 
no beneficiary in whose behalf such an action can be brought." Lindgren v. United 
States, 281 U.S. 38, 41 (1930). 
24. Act of March 20, 1920, ch. 111, 41 Stat. 537, 46 U.S.C. §§ 761-68 (1970). 
25. 46 u.s.c. § 761 (1970). 
26. See, e.g., National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 
885 (1959) (recovery by representatives of deceased airline passengers). 
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statute differs from the Jones Act in the standard of care,27 statute of 
limitations, 28 and beneficiaries.20 The internal differences in the 
statutory remedies30 as well as the sporadic use of state law resulted 
in inconsistent coverage, 31 which permitted different awards to sim-
ilar plaintiffs depending upon where they were injured. This situa-
tion compelled Supreme Court clarification in Moragne. 
In Moragne a longshoreman was killed while working on board 
a vessel in navigable waters within the State of Florida.32 His widow 
brought an action against the owner of the vessel in state court to 
recover damages for wrongful death. Her claims sounded both in 
unseaworthiness and negligence.33 After removal of the case to 
federal district court on the basis of diversity of citizenship,84 the 
owner moved for dismissal of the ·wrongful death claim, in so far as 
it was based on unseaworthiness, on the grounds that (I) general 
maritime law provided no remedy for wrongful death within terri-
torial waters (The Harrisburg) and (2) unseaworthiness was not a 
basis for liability under the Florida Wrongful Death Act.3i; The 
district court dismissed that part of the complaint but made the 
necessary certification36 to permit an appeal. The court of appeals 
affirmed the dismissal37 after the Supreme Court of Florida answered 
a certified question to the effect that the Florida statute did not 
permit recovery based on unseaworthiness.38 The United States 
Supreme Court reversed, overruling The Harrisburg and holding 
27. Under FELA, the standard of care is "negligence" (45 U.S.C. § 51 (1970)), while 
under the DOHSA, liability is imposed for any "wrongful act, neglect, or default" 
(46 U.S.C. § 761 (1970)). The latter statute has been read to include an action for 
unseaworthiness; the former, to include only pure negligence actions. See Moragnc v. 
States Marine Lines, Inc., 398 U.S. 375, 395 (1970). 
28. The DOHSA specifies a two-year period from the date of the wrongful act 
(46 U.S.C. § 763 (1970)), while the FELA allows three years from date of death (45 U.S.C. 
§ 56 (1970)). 
29. FELA beneficiaries are mutually exclusive (see note 23 supra); the class of 
DOHSA beneficiaries is significantly broader and is not composed of mutually exclu-
sive groups. A seaman who dies on the high seas is covered by both the Jones Act and 
the DOHSA. The Four Sisters, 75 F. Supp. 399 (D. Mass. 1947) (recovery by a father 
under Jones Act did not bar a recovery by a sister of deceased under DOHSA). 
30. For an excellent schematic breakdown of the various acts, see M. NoRRJs, MARI· 
TIME.PERSONAL INJURIES 340-44 (2d ed. 1966). 
31. See note 43 infra and accompanying text. See generally Day, Maritime Wrongful 
Death and Survival Recovery: The Need for Legislative Reform, 64 CoLUllt, L. R.Ev, 
648 (1964); Note, ]udidal Expansion of Remedies for Wrongful Death in Admiralty: 
A Proposal, 49 B.U. L. R.Ev. 114 (1969). 
32. 398 U.S. at 376. 
33. See 398 U.S. at 376. 
34. 398 U.S. at 376. 
35. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.01 (1964). 
36. 398 U.S. at 376. See 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1970). 
37. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 409 F.2d 32 (5th Cir. 1969). 
38. Moragne v. States Marine Lines, Inc., 211 S.2d 161 (Fla. 1968). 
March 1972] Recent Developments 761 
that a ·wrongful death action may be brought under general maritime 
law for violation of a maritime duty.39 
An unanimous court, per Justice Harlan, attacked the holding 
of The Harrisburg as "somewhat dubious even when rendered."40 
Harlan examined the judicial and statutory developments in the 
law since the case was decided and concluded that these develop-
ments had so weakened the common-law rationale for the decision 
that it could no longer be considered valid.41 Looking then to the 
federal enactments that provided wrongful death actions, the Court 
determined that they were not intended to be exhaustive or pre-
clusive.42 Indeed, the existence of these statutes, far from precluding 
recognition of a general maritime remedy, argued in its favor. Only 
by recognizing a general right to recover for wrongful death could 
interstices between the statutes be covered and disparities in treat-
ment be amended.43 
Justice Harlan articulated the main thrust of the decision when 
he said: 
Our recognition of a right to recover for wrongful death under gen-
eral maritime law will assure uniform vindication of federal policies, 
removing the tensions and discrepancies that have resulted from the 
necessity to accommodate state remedial statutes to exclusively mari-
time substantive concepts .... Such uniformity not only will further 
the concerns of both of the 1920 acts but also will give effect to the 
constitutionally based principle that federal admiralty law should be 
a "system of law coextensive with and operating uniformly in, the 
whole country."44 
The purpose of Moragne, therefore, was to make a uniform pro-
vision for recovery for any plaintiff who is injured or killed while at 
sea or employed as a seaman. 
Traditionally, personal representatives of a deceased seaman have 
not been allowed a recovery for other than pecuniary losses45 under 
39. 398 U.S. at 409. 
40. 398 U.S. at 378. 
41. 398 U.S. at 388. 
42. 398 U.S. at 402. 
43. The disparities noted by the Moragne Court were (1) "that whenever the rule 
of The Harrisburg holds sway: within territorial waters, identical conduct violating 
federal law • . • [the theory of unseaworthiness] produces liability if the victim is 
merely injured, but frequently not if he is killed"; (2) "that identical breaches of the 
duty to provide a seaworthy ship, resulting in death, produce liability outside the 
three mile limit [under DOHSA] •.• but not within the territorial waters of a state 
whose local statute excludes unseaworthiness claims"; and (3) "that the true seaman, 
that is, a member of a ship's company, covered by the Jones Act-is provided no 
remedy for death caused by unseaworthiness within territorial waters, while a long-
shoreman .•• does have such a remedy when allowed by a state statute." 398 U.S. at 
395-96. 
44. 398 U.S. at 401-02, quoting The Lottawanna, 88 U.S. (21 Wall.) 558, 575 (1875). 
45. As a general matter, the damage award in wrongful death actions is measured 
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the Jones Act46 and the DOHSA.47 The district court in Sincere 
recognized this fact,48 although it conspicuously omitted reference 
to similar holdings under general maritime law.49 Reading Moragne 
as "not so much reject[ing] the rationale of The Harrisburg as rely-
[ing] on significant developments in the one hundred fifty years 
since,"50 the court looked at the laws of the various states that permit 
nonpecuniary damages and found them to be "the most persuasive 
guides to decision."51 Concluding that these "persuasive guides" 
pointed to recovery, the district court awarded damages for the sur-
viving spouse's mental pain and suffering.52 The decision seemed to 
turn on the unstated conclusion that Moragne was premised on state 
law developments other than the simple recognition of the propriety 
of a ·wrongful death action.53 Moragne did look to state law develop-
ments in that they provided recovery for ·wrongful death, a fact that 
not only undercut the rationale of The Harrisburg but also created 
a situation in which diverse state laws were occupying a field aban-
doned by federal law.54 It was the latter point in particular that con-
cerned the Moragne Court. The cause of inconsistent recoveries for 
various plaintiffs was not so much the particularities of various state 
laws, but rather the total absence of a federal cause of action that 
necessitated the application of any state act.55 The thrust of Moragne 
was to achieve uniformity by creating a general federal cause of 
action, obviating the necessity of recourse to any state statute. 
by and limited to the pecuniary benefits that the beneficiaries might reasonably have 
expected to receive from the decedent. See generally W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 
905-10 (4th ed. 1971); Page, "Pecuniary" Damages for Wrongful Death, 1963 TRIAL 
LAW. GUIDE 398. 
46. Michigan Cent. R.R. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59 (1913) (FELA); Neal v. Saga Ship• 
ping Co., 407 F.2d 481 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 986 (1969); Petition of Marina 
Merchante Nicaraguense, 248 F. Supp. 15 (S.D.N.Y. 1965), modified on other grounds, 
364 F.2d 118 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967); Orona v. Isbrandtsen 
Co., 204 F. Supp. 777 (S.D.N.Y. 1962), afjd., 313 F.2d 241 (2d Cir. 1963). 
47. The limitation to pecuniary damages is part of the statutory language of the 
DOHSA ("recovery in [a suit under the act] ••• shall be a fair and just compensation 
for the pecuniary loss sustained by the persons for whose benefit the suit is brought 
•••. " 46 U.S.C. § 742 (1970)). See, e.g., First Natl. Bank v. National Airlines, Inc., 288 
F.2d 621 (2d Cir. 1961); National Airlines v. Stiles, 268 F.2d 400 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 
361 U.S. 885 (1959); Petition of Moore-McCormack Lines, Inc., 184 F. Supp. 585 (S,D.N.Y. 
1960), modified on other grounds, 295 F.2d 583 (2d Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 
989 (1962). 
48. See 329 F. Supp. at 655. 
49. See, e.g., Igneri v. Cie de Transports Oceaniques, 323 F.2d 257 (2d Cir. 1963), 
cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949 (1964); Simpson v. Knut Knutsen, O.A.S., 296 F. Supp. 1308 
(N.D. Cal. 1969), modified, 444 F.2d 523 (9th Cir. 1971); Valitutto v. D/S I/D Garonne, 
295 F. Supp. 764 (S.D.N.Y. 1969). 
50. 329 F. Supp. at 657. 
51. 329 F. Supp. at 656-57. 
52. 329 F. Supp. at 661. 
53. See 398 U.S. at 388-90. 
54. See text accompanying notes 15-19 supra. 
55. 398 U.S. at 401. 
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Other federal courts that have considered whether nonpecuniary 
damages could be awarded in the newly created general maritime 
wrongful death suit have read Moragne as clearly precluding any 
consideration of state statutes or case law and compelling the denial 
of recovery for nonpecuniary harm. In Petition of United States 
Steel Corp.,66 the court denied recovery to five surviving widows 
for loss of consortium in actions brought under general maritime 
law. In so holding, the court of ·appeals construed Moragne to mean 
that "all facets of that right of recovery, including the measure of 
damages [are] to be governed by the principles of the general mari-
time law."57 It is interesting to note that the court in United States 
Steel focused in part on the necessity for promoting a uniform and 
supreme federal maritime law.58 In Petition of Canal Barge Co.,59 
recovery by a widow and her children was limited to pecuniary 
awards of the type previously recognized by federal decisions. The 
court said that to supplement the general maritime law by borrow-
ing from state law in computing damages would present a "classic 
example of confusion" that could not be permitted in light of 
Moragne.60 
On the other hand, the precise measure of damages to be 
awarded under the new federal remedy was not explicitly set forth 
in Moragne.61 The Supreme Court in fact indicated that in deter-
mining damages "the courts will not be without persuasive analogy 
for guidance. Both the Death on the High Seas Act and the numerous 
state wrongful-death acts have been implemented with success for 
decades."62 Thus, if one were not predisposed to read Moragne as 
absolutely compelling uniformity in damages, as were the courts in 
United States Steel and Canal Barge, there is, at least in dicta, sup-
port for the proposition that the Sincere court could examine state 
law. Yet the reference to state statutes is not an absolute mandate .to 
consider or be bound by state law. It merely suggests an authority 
that could be consulted. Concerning other equally important ques-
tions, Moragne set out guidelines for the lower courts to use in 
filling out the new federal remedy. Questions were raised concern-
ing the applicable statute of limitations and the identity of benefi-
ciaries under the new right. 63 In reference to the former, the 
Moragne Court suggested that it might be feasible to adopt the 
general maritime doctrine of !aches, reflected in the two-year pro-
56. 436 F.2d 1256 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 987 (1971). 
57. 436 F.2d at 1279. 
58. 436 F.2d at 1279. 
59. 323 F. Supp. 805 (N.D. Miss. 1971). 
60. 323 F. Supp. at 821. 
61. See 398 U.S. at 408. 
62. 398 U.S. at 408. 
63. See 398 U.S. at 406-08. 
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vision found in the DOHSA.64 With respect to the latter, the Court 
indicated that the beneficiary provisions of the DOHSA might 
properly be applied since that Act relates to the death of "any per-
son" rather than to a specific class of persons as does the Jones Act. or; 
Thus, as to these two open questions, the Supreme Court specifi-
cally turned to the existing federal statutes for guidance and did 
not discuss the possibility of any reference to state law. The opinion 
as a whole seems to direct the attention of the lower court to federal 
sources. 
The Sincere court specifically recognized Moragne's goal when it 
stated: "This conclusion [in favor of a nonpecuniary award] may 
conflict with Moragne's goal of uniformity of recovery for all who 
perish on navigable waters."66 With the goal of ultimate uniformity 
in mind, the award of this element of damages seems particularly 
inappropriate. If every federal district court were to follow the law 
of the state in which it is sitting, the majority would not be in accord 
with Sincere. Damages for survivors' mental pain and suffering are 
permitted with sufficient specificity to provide a "guideline" favoring 
the award in only nine states,67 and the desirability or propriety of 
such an award has long been debated.68 
64. 398 U.S. at 406 (referring to 46 U.S.C. § 763 (1970)). 
65. 398 U.S. at 407-08. 
66. 329 F. Supp. at 657. 
67. The states clearly allowing an award for beneficiaries' mental pain and suffering, 
either by statute or case law, are as follows: Arkansas (A.rut. STAT. ANN. § 27-909 (1962) 
(recovery limited to immediate family or one in loco parentis)); Florida {FLA. STAT. ANN, 
§ 768.03 (1964) (recovery limited to parents who lose minor child)); Kansas (KAN, STAT, 
ANN. § 60-1904 (1964)): Louisiana (Kaough v. Hadley, 165 S. 748 (La. App. 1936) (mi-
nor)); Palmer v. American Gen. Ins. Co., 126 S.2d 777 (La. App. 1960) (deceased child)); 
Maryland (MD, ANN. CODE art. 67, § 4 (1970) (for death of spouse or minor child)); 
South Carolina (Gomillion v. Forsythe, 218 S.C. 211, 62 S.E.2d 297 (1950)); South Da-
kota (Simons v. Kidd, 73 S.D. 306, 42 N.W.2d 307 (1950)); Virginia (Matthews v. Hicks, 
197 Va. 112, 87 S.E.2d 629 (1955)): West Virginia (Lester v. Rose, 147 W. Va. 575, 130 
S.E.2d 80 (1963)). 
In addition to these dear authorities, there are peculiarities in other state laws that 
will permit recovery of some questionable "pecuniary" losses, often at the caprice of 
a jury. This is especially true of a wrongful death of a child. See Comment, A Modern 
View of Wrongful Death Recoveries: Herein of the Infant and the Aged, 54 Nw. U. L, 
REv. 254 (1959). However, the important point is that the law is unclear and there is 
much debate. See note 68 infra. The statutes and cases noted above arc the few that are 
sufficiently dear to be reasonably considered as "guidelines" permitting the recovery of 
the beneficiaries' mental pain and suffering in a wrongful death action. There is much 
commentary that attempts to digest the law of this area. See, e.g., Page, supra note 45; 
Comment, Recovery for Mental Anguish of Survivors in Wrongful Death Actions, 18 AnK. 
L. REv. 161 (1964); Comment, Wrongful Death Damages in North Carolina, 4•1 N.C. L. 
REv. 402 (1966) (extensive review of all state law); Comment, 54 Nw. U. L. REv. 254, 
supra (extensive review of all state law). 
68. See, e.g., Duffey, The Maldistribution of Damages in Wrongful Death, 19 Omo 
ST. L.J. 264 (1958); Green, Relational Interests, 29 ILL. L. REv. 460 (1934); Meyer, 
A New Death Act, 43 DICK. L. REv. 83 (1939); Miller, Dead Men in Torts: Lord Camp-
bell's Act Was Not Enough, 19 CATH. U. L. REv. 283 (1970); Oppenheim, The Survival 
of Tort Actions and the Action for Wrongful Death-A Survey and a Proposal, 16 TUL, 
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The award of nonpecuniary damages for the survivors' mental 
pain and suffering would make Justice Harlan's specific guidance 
logically inconsistent since the DOHSA will clearly not permit the 
award.69 There is obviously some congressional design expressed by 
the wording of the DOHSA, and it should be accorded weight when 
seeking a uniform recovery under M oragne. The more reasonable 
way to read Harlan's guidance is to use state law to the extent that 
it is compatible with the federal statute.70 
The use of state wrongful death law in admiralty cases has re-
sulted in inconsistent recoveries. Moragne attempted to "bring more 
placid waters"71 by recognizing a remedy for wrongful death under 
general maritime law. The award by the Sincere court did not 
further this goal of uniformity by taking an element of damages 
permitted by a small minority of states so early in the life of a new 
federal remedy. The court chose to disregard opposite authority that 
had been specifically suggested by the Supreme Court. By permitting 
such an award, the Sincere court has created a situation in which 
identical plaintiffs will receive different awards depending on where 
they bring their action or on whether they sue under general mari-
time law or one of the federal acts. This is precisely the problem 
the Moragne decision attempted to alleviate. Any departures from 
previous maritime law on damages should be left to the Supreme 
Court; in the interim, uniformity should prevail. 
L. R.Ev. 386 (1942); Schumacher, Rights of Action Under Death and Survival Statutes, 
23 l\fICH. L. REV. ll4 (1924); Comment, 18 ARK. L. REV. 161, supra note 67; Comment, 
44 N.C. L. REV. 402, supra note 67; Comment, 54 Nw. U. L. R.Ev. 254, supra note 67; 
Note, Death of the Head of the Family-Elements of Damages Under South Carolina's 
Lord Campbell's Act, 19 S. CAR. L. REv. 220 (1967). 
69. See note 47 supra. 
70. There is an additional constitutional dimension to the question of uniformity 
in the admiralty area. As Justice Harlan noted in Moragne with his quote from The 
Lottawanna (see text accompanying note 44 supra), admiralty law is unique. Article III, 
§ 2 of the Constitution specifically allocates admiralty jurisdiction to the federal courts 
("The judicial power shall extend .•. to all cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdic-
tion ••• "). The Supreme Court affirmed the principle of federal supremacy in ad-
miralty in Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 244 U.S. 205 (1917). Justice Harlan's quotation 
from The Lottawanna as the capstone of his plea for uniformity suggests that the 
Court in Moragne was aware of the extra measure of force given their decision by the 
Constitution. When conflicts arise between general federal maritime law and local law, 
the local law must yield. See, e.g., Kossick. v. United Fruit Co., 365 U.S. 731 (1961); 
Romero v. International Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354 (1958); Pope &: Talbot, 
Inc. v. Hawn, 346 U.S. 375 (1953); Panama R.R. v. Johnson, 264 U.S. 375 (1924); 
Chelentis v. Luckenbach S.S. Co., 247 U.S. 372 (1918); Southern Pac. Co. v. Jensen, 241 
U.S. 205 (1917). 
71. 398 U.S. at 408. 
